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FOREWORD: LOOKING FOR A MIRACLE?  WOMEN, WORK, AND 
EFFECTIVE LEGAL CHANGE 
CATHERINE L. FISK* 
If you were asked to blurt out the first few words that popped into your 
head in response to the words “gender, work, and law,” what would you say?  
The answer to that question tells us something about the current state of our 
culture, the law, and legal scholarship on gender, work, and the law.  If we take 
the topics of the fine collection of articles published in this volume as an answer 
to the question, the words blurted out would be something like “women, 
children, discrimination, working time, and sex.”  If you asked the same person 
to identify the biggest barriers to gender equality at work, you might generate a 
similar list. 
It is perhaps no surprise that the things that define women and work are 
the things that have proved to be the most resistant to the legal changes brought 
about by the long struggles of twentieth-century feminism.  Digging deeper into 
the insights produced by the scholars whose work you hold in your hands (or 
can read on the screen), we see both the social transformation that the law has 
wrought in the area of gender in the workplace, but also how resistant social 
norms and economic inequality are to change through the law. 
Four decades after the enactment of Title VII, American law continues to 
imagine that children and sex shape and constrain the role of women at work 
but not the role of men.  In the legal imagination, children and sex have always 
been crucial in defining the nature and significance of gender.  Children and sex 
play a dual role in constructing the law’s vision of gender: they are sometimes 
seen as necessary to, and sometimes as constraints on, women’s ability to 
achieve economic parity with men, psychic peace for themselves, and respect 
and status in their social interactions. 
Notwithstanding the ambitions of twentieth-century feminism and legal 
liberalism, both of which held that law reform could transform society, 
redistribute power, and reshape the human psyche by eliminating bias, law’s 
vision of women and work has maintained a stable core since industrialization 
and the ideology of middle- and upper-class domesticity and a separate 
women’s sphere developed in the nineteenth century.  That is, law imagines a 
fundamental conflict between women’s wage work and a healthy family life, 
whereas men’s wage work is regarded as the foundation of family.  Moreover, 
law has not fundamentally changed its heteronormative view that sex is a 
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dangerously destabilizing force in the workplace and that women introduce sex 
to a workplace that could otherwise shut it out. 
The articles in this volume illuminate the many facets of and deep structure 
of the law’s vision of the gendered culture of work.  It is noteworthy that in a 
volume on the theme of women and work, all the articles address, in one form 
or another, one of two topics: children and sexuality.  The authors acknowledge 
the desire of many women to find fulfillment through family and to express (but 
control) their bodies and sexuality, yet the articles also illustrate the myriad 
ways that women’s bodies and children have been and remain sources of gender 
subordination.  The challenge for contemporary legal reform is to negotiate an 
accommodation between these conflicting tendencies. 
On the question of whether or to what extent law should force work to 
accommodate family, the articles reveal a profound conflict over whether 
accommodation will enable women to achieve equality in the workplace or will 
increase financial incentives for firms to avoid hiring women and perpetuate the 
notion that work-life conflicts are a women’s issue.  Reading deeper in them, one 
can see some doubts over whether an ideology of accommodation will in fact be 
a barrier to equality. 
In addressing the question of the law’s role in accommodating work to 
family life (or vice versa), one must consider whether a legal and political 
demand that work accommodate family reinforces a gender stereotype or 
changes it.  Theresa Gabaldon and Nicole Porter both remind us that America is 
currently in an era in which children are ascendant.  Porter argues that the 
notion that women must be “supermoms”—because in an era of children’s 
ascendance that is how we imagine a good mother—is part of women’s 
oppression.  Gabaldon explores the unprecedented role of children as 
consumers in modern society and advocates legal restrictions on corporate 
business strategies that target children for the sale of harmful products.  She 
makes the crucial point that wealthy children as well as poor ones need 
protection from unregulated capitalism, and that women’s work has lately been 
imagined as being inconsistent with that protective role.  Children’s adult-
determined “needs,” their advertising-manipulated desires, their striving 
parents’ ambitions for their achievement—all these are imagined to define and 
to dominate the purpose of family.  That which defines the purpose of family 
defines the agenda of women.  Of course, as Vicki Lens, Michael Selmi and 
Naomi Cahn remind us, the primacy of children is a distinctly middle- and 
upper-class ideology; the poor in America, like the poor everywhere, are 
supposed to work and are thought to serve their children best by working, not 
by staying home, and the middle and upper classes seem to expect little from 
poor children.  But in America, upper-class ideologies are the ones that always 
dominate the law’s imagery, so the supermom trumps the working mom as the 
norm of perfect motherhood. 
The ideology of children’s primacy and the norm of children’s achievement 
operate to maintain a necessarily separate sphere for women.  Consider how the 
regnant American vision of the role of children in a family differs from that of 
much of the world and even of America and Europe a century ago.  Children do 
not exist to work, unlike most children in most cultures for most of history, nor 
do they have their own sphere, as you might imagine they did if you read 
01_FISK_FOREWORD.DOC 4/28/2006  8:50 AM 
 FOREWORD 3 
children’s literature (a realm in which adults are unnecessary and therefore 
absent).  Rather, American society envisions that children need to have their 
parents to entertain them (so they are not seduced by TV and video games); to 
educate them (so they achieve); to chaperone them from school to sports to 
lessons to friends to the mall (because children lack autonomy of movement).  If 
this is your vision of children, and if you imagine family as being about 
nurturing children, and if you envision women as being the protectors of family, 
then of course work must accommodate family, and thus work must 
accommodate women.  That, in turn, perpetuates rather than transforms the 
gender stereotype that has subordinated women since the rise of the cult of 
domesticity in the nineteenth century.  As Porter points out, educated wealthy 
women play a large role in creating and maintaining the architecture of 
children’s primacy, because it justifies the existence of the highly-educated 
woman who has given up her job as a lawyer, business person, or doctor to 
devote herself to raising children.  And, as Gabaldon cleverly argues, the 
problem is not that women’s work is bad for children; the problem is that 
women’s constant supervision of children is thought necessary to protect them 
from the myriad bad influences that corporate marketing departments 
constantly bombard them with.  If you’re attracted to utopian thinking when 
contemplating law reform, you could say that we should focus less on how to 
restructure work so that women could be at home with their kids more, and 
more on why it is that children seem to need constant parental supervision. 
Time is the battlefield on which the conflict between family and work is 
envisioned to be waged.  There are many reasons for thinking of time as a 
terrain of battle.  The most obvious is that middle-aged professionals who 
experience scarcity primarily as a shortage of time rather than a shortage of 
money are the ones who write legal scholarship.  We write what we know, and 
what we know is that we’ve got too much to do and too little time.  Selmi and 
Cahn remind us just how class-specific that perception is; they assert that three 
quarters of the increase in working time in recent years is due to growth of dual-
earner households; the remaining quarter is an increase in working time, 
particularly among dual-earner couples.  It is also important to remember that a 
scarcity of time among the upper classes is a modern phenomenon: I’ve just re-
read all of Jane Austen’s novels, and time was not in short supply in well-to-do 
Regency England as she portrays it.  These articles force us to think about time 
and thus help us to see why the impermeability of the maternal wall, as Joan 
Williams has aptly named the barrier to women’s equality, is of quite a different 
nature than the impermeability of the glass ceiling.  We think we know how the 
law can change biased attitudes—although the persistence of the glass ceiling 
reminds us that plain old-fashioned unconscious bias is a bit difficult to change, 
and Ellen Sekreta’s article on sexual harassment of women in research 
laboratories shows that some old-fashioned bias exists in the hierarchical world 
of science—but we haven’t figured out how law can add another eight hours to 
the day. 
Another major theme of these articles has to do with sex at work.  Michele 
Alexandre powerfully reminds us that the female body has long been, and 
remains, the site on which heterosexual society projects its sexual imagination.  
The question whether freedom for women is best achieved by sexual liberation 
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or sexual suppression has divided feminists for decades, and the divide can be 
seen in these articles.  Will protecting the ability to form romantic, intimate, or 
affective attachments at work ultimately liberate women, because it will reduce 
the retaliation against women when it occurs?  Or is it better to pursue a legal 
strategy that attempts to prohibit sexual overtures because in the real world, 
particularly in insular workplaces where power remains in male hands, sexual 
overtures are more likely to harm women?  Sharon Rabin-Margalioth might be 
read to suggest the former, and views liberation as essential.  That is, she points 
out that while workplace rules that prohibit romantic attachments or marriages 
between workers do not always protect women from unwanted sex or 
favoritism, they sometimes force women out of the workplace by making them 
choose between their relationship and their job.  Sekreta, by contrast, seems to 
tend toward the view that prohibiting sexual relations in the workplace may be 
the only way to empower women to resist abuses of power that manifest in 
sexual harassment.  Sekreta is skeptical about whether sex at work will free 
women.  And Lorraine Schmall’s wide-ranging effort to recast birth control as a 
labor law issue shows how a backlash against liberated sexuality manifests itself 
as a moral attack on contraception.  As she points out, so-called “pharmacist 
conscience” policies, which allow pharmacists to refuse to fill prescriptions and 
pharmacies to refuse to sell birth control devices, are portrayed as protecting the 
rights of employees, but operate to subordinate women.  There is no general 
right of employees to refuse to do those parts of their job that offend their 
morals; pharmacists who disapprove of birth control are given rights that most 
employees lack, and they gain those rights at the expense of women.  Now that 
many speculate there are five votes on the United States Supreme Court to 
overrule Roe v. Wade, Schmall’s history of the long fight to secure reproductive 
freedom reminds us that workplace equality will exist only where there is 
reproductive freedom. 
Yet another prism through which to view these articles is doctrinal: in one 
way or another, all of them consider what sort of legal regime might transform 
(a) the cultural climate regarding women, family, work, and sex, and (b) the 
economy of women’s work.  Joan Williams, Elizabeth Westfall, and Sharon 
Rabin-Margalioth cast their lot with antidiscrimination law, urging us to see and 
address the barriers to women’s equality in the framework of civil rights.  A 
more creative approach to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act and a less crabbed notion of the discrimination effected by 
antinepotism rules and antifraternization rules are, in their view, part of a legal 
strategy of women’s empowerment.  Sekreta includes within her analysis not 
only Title VII and Title IX, but also laws regulating misconduct in laboratories as 
tools to combat sexual harassment in the workplace.  Susan Carle’s insightful 
analysis of the affirmative defense in sexual harassment cases is a powerful 
argument about how technical legal doctrines are used to undermine a law that 
has, but may fail to realize, the potential to transform sexual exploitation at 
work.  Like Williams, Westfall, Sekreta, and Rabin-Margalioth, Carle too 
advocates a civil rights strategy. 
In contrast, Lens, Gabaldon, Alexandre, Selmi and Cahn look to legal 
change that is more overtly about changing the architecture of economic 
entitlements (as in the case of Lens’ work on welfare), changing the legal duties 
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of large-scale corporations who are dominant economic actors (as in the case of 
Gabaldon’s focus on corporate law), or changing public policy regarding work 
schedules, school schedules and day care, and domestic violence (as Selmi and 
Cahn suggest).  Alexandre pursues a third way, one that you might consider 
more ideological, in calling for an across-the-board effort by women to 
“infiltrate the political system” in Trinidad and Tobago to transform an entire 
jurisprudence of gender bias.1 
The most significant convergence of all the articles is in their creative efforts 
to devise ways that law can change aspects of culture that have proven far more 
resistant to change than many feminist legal theorists acknowledged decades 
ago.  It turns out that transforming society through changing law is so difficult 
that it seems almost miraculous when it occurs.  Twenty years ago, in my first 
published article, I chose to tackle what I thought was the last major remaining 
barrier to women’s workplace equality: the difficulty of combining work and 
family.2  In the mid-1980s, I was quite sure that the Family and Medical Leave 
Act was never going to get out of Congress or past President Reagan’s veto, so I 
developed a theory of how a failure to accommodate family care responsibilities 
was sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.  My goal was to force employers 
to provide childcare for employees on the low-end of the pay scale; I figured 
that rich families would take care of themselves.  Even as I wrote, I knew my 
legal arguments were a bit of a stretch, but I regarded the project as a “thought 
piece” that might catalyze new approaches to removing an obstacle to the 
liberation of working class single mothers.  I was, without a doubt, astonishingly 
naïve.  Even accounting for that, however, the intervening twenty years have 
suggested the enormous difficulty of identifying a legal strategy that will 
transform the social norms that structure gender inequality at work.  If you had 
told me then that we’d still be struggling with the exact same issue now, except 
that not even wealthy families would have figured out how to raise children 
while allowing all parents to have paying jobs, I would have been stunned.  The 
articles that comprise this volume help us understand why the law has failed to 
change social norms regarding gender, family, and work that an earlier 
generation of lawyers naively thought might occur.  As it stands today, the 
authors of these articles are debating, to use Porter’s phrasing, whether law-
plus-sustained effort can change the institutional cultures that perpetuate 
women’s subordination, or whether it requires a miracle.  I don’t believe in 
miracles, so my money is on the law.  And these articles are wonderful 
contributions to that long-term project. 
 
 1. Reading Alexandre together with Schmall, here’s an idea for a legal strategy based on body 
protest: the women in Aristophanes’ Lysistrata refused sex with their husbands until the men made 
peace with Sparta.  Perhaps, if contraception and abortion become unavailable, women should 
pursue a similar strategy until reproductive freedom is guaranteed. 
 2. Catherine L. Fisk, Employer-Provided Child Care Under Title VII: Toward an Employer’s Duty to 
Accommodate Child Care Responsibilities of Employees, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 89 (1986). 
